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The State of PARTIES, *and of the* PUBLICK; *as influenc'd by those* Parties, *in this Conjuncture, offered to* ENGLISH MEN.

THIS a miserable Circumstance, and the General Ruine of prosperous States, when Parties out of Separate Interests and Passions pursue different Ends of their own, without regard to the Publick, although the chief Interest of each: But it is a Circumstance beyond common Misery, a Propensity to ruine more than natural, and a Fatality over Mankind, greater than has been ever observed, perhaps, in any Country or Set of Men, that they should be divided into Parties from the Publick Interest, when there is not so much as any *real* particular Interest, *in effect*, carrying on in any of those different Parties; not any of these discriminating Interests *so laid*, or *so pursued*, as that, by all the violent Steps taken by the Engagers, they are any ways advanced: So that although Violence be done, and still doing perpetually to the Publick; though all contend for the Promotion of that Interest or Party under which they *only* look for any Happiness; Yet for all this, *not one* of these Interests receive any Advantage; not one of these Parties are likely to procure or come any thing near their End.

Our Nation must be allowed to be in a most compleat way to Misery, if this be proved their Case.

That there are Parties is well known. The first great Division is between King *William* and King *James*; which takes in all our present active Men: For as for *Commonwealth's-men*, which some would have to be a *third* Distinction; besides the Turn it serves at Court, it has no meaning; unless the quiet Part of *England*, those tired with Revolutions, and farther Engagements with Men of these Days, or those that are divided in their Thoughts upon the Interests of either King, as they stand to *England*; unless, I say, these be they call'd *Commonwealth's-men*, however absurd it be.

Of these *two* Interests, that of King *James*'s does properly make but *one* Party, though the other *two*. Those, I say, make but one Party, as they act in the Publick: for they having in Prospect *only*, and as the End of all their Agitations, the Government of King *James*; they are not *now* divided, nor can be *yet*, whilst unprevailing, in any Dispute or Difference considerable about Administration, as *how*, by *whom*, or in what Methods, favouring one or other Party,

that Government ſhall be carried on. The ſide, *then*, of the now-governing King being divided into *Whig* and *Tory*, there are but *three* Parties that pull different ways, or with any noted Force in the Publick Affairs.

The meaning of all theſe Men, if they have their main Intereſt, their Stake, Eſtate and Friends, in *England*, is and muſt be to preſerve *England*, though not from perfect Monarchy, and *abſolute Power* of a Crown *at home*, (which ſome approve of, and like the beſt, whatever Name of Tyranny or Slavery it has heretofore gone by) yet to preſerve us, at leaſt, from the Yoak of *Foreign Power*, from being over-grown by States that are about us, and coming down from being the *Principal* in Power and Riches, to be the *laſt* of *Europe*, or but once *inferiour* to any of theſe neighbouring ones, which will turn to *as much*, ſince it neceſſarily ſubjects us to the Miſeries of thoſe Invaſions we indured *of old*, as then the Common Prey of all the World, and every riſing Nation. This ſurely, whatever elſe may be *his* Intereſt, is the Intereſt of every individual *Engliſh-man*, in all theſe Parties, to prevent: But if this be what is leaſt done; if this not only be *not* prevented, but be the *only* thing that every Party, every Side, though not *intentionally*, yet *really*, does draw on, advance, promote, and *nothing elſe*, no not their *Party-Intereſt*, not any valuable Victory or Triumph that *one* may gain above *another*, ſo much as gratifying a Paſſion; Then are we in that State I mention'd; in the faireſt, moſt miraculous way that can be thought on to every thing that can be call'd Ruine or Deſtruction to a Country.

That when we loſe our Strength, we are more miſerable than any other People, the ſureſt Seat of the moſt various, ſharp and laſting War, Experience the moſt remarkable that ever was, has taught us, from the higheſt Remembrance of our ſelves through Romans, Danes, Saxons, and many Nations more (though leſs remark'd) down to the *laſt* Normans, and that concluding Conqueſt which by the Power of the Conqueror abroad, and the Continuance of his Line here, eſtabliſhed us on our own Bottom. And that this was not meer Misfortune, but that it is a Fate peculiar to *us*, I mean, that it is a natural Evil to *us* more than any Country, when we are low, who-ever ſtudies *our Situation*, and the Growths of Nations on the Continent, will know, *that* ſuch a Country as this is more diſputable than any other: *that* the Dominion of it cannot be ſo fixed, and the immediate Maſters of it, however powerful on the Continent, not able to inſure to themſelves the Poſſeſſion of it, by holding it out againſt Strangers, or guarding it from their Enemy, ſo well as of other Places: *that this* is, in that Senſe, as a Frontier Country; with this Difference, that thoſe that are *really* Frontier Countries, though they are ſo this Day, may have the luck not to be ſo a little while after; but that this Country has always the *Nature* of a Frontier, ever to maintain War in it, and to be the *Subject* and *Place* of Contention amongſt thoſe that are ſtronger than it ſelf;

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when-ever ſuch there are. In fine; *That* as we are an Iſland, and have the Sea round us; ſo by being Maſters of that, (which is, in ſhort, by *being in the Practice of it moſt*, and can be no otherwiſe) we muſt of Conſequence be the ſtrongeſt in the World, as the World is now turn'd to Navigation, and each Country by Degrees at length brought to depend abſolutely on *Trade*, by wanting many Neceſſaries from foreign Places, which *once* they could live without perhaps, but *ſince* cannot; nor can defend themſelves without: this being the Change that the improved Art of Navigation has made in the World; tying Countries to a reciprocal Dependency on one another for their Growths, and obliging them to *ſome ſort* of Correſpondency. But on the other ſide, *that* as we are the ſtrongeſt in Situation by being an Iſland, *the Dominion of the Sea ſuppos'd to be with us:* ſo *that* being loſt to us, in any other Hands, or divided amongſt others, we are of all the moſt and worſt expoſed.

This being granted, it follows, that whatever Circumſtances of ours admit other Nations, *Foreigners*, *whatſoever* to grow, (though at the ſame time we were granted to grow too) ſo, as *in Proportion*, above us in *Navigation and Trade*; this neceſſarily ſubjects us to all the Miſeries before pointed at, and is the direct way leading to a Conſequence that is no ways to be evaded: for when that Work is done, and the Advantage once given up; what ever Party do (as they think) their Work; 'tis altogether vain to imagine that any ſuch Party, or any Party whatſoever prevailing in this Nation, or all of them united in one, can call it back, or by any Means, Arts of State, *Treaties* or *Engagements* whatſoever, to be able to turn off that inevitable Evil that muſt light on All at once. And if *this* be the Conſequence of all the Actings of every one of theſe Parties at preſent; if in the ſeeking of their own Ends they are likely not ſo much to prevail either of them over another, as to reduce us into this State, this irrecoverable Conſumption and Debility, with all the Conſequences proved; then will it be found that in the Methods now taken they act conſtantly *againſt*, but *for* no Intereſt that can be called their own.

All Men naturally follow their Good: and it might be well objected that it were only *a Notion*, and in effect impoſſible, that Men ſhould act thus, as I ſay, were it not through Ignorance; ſuch as is indeed in our Caſe, *the Want of a ſufficient Conception and real Senſe at Heart, of what is the ſole Safeguard and Support of our Country*; the want of truly conſidering how Matters ſtand, as to *that*, and how amidſt all, *that* is likely to be affected, which muſt (as I have ſaid) affect us, at laſt, above every thing elſe. And ſuch a Blindneſs as this it is that Men are kept in by their Paſſions, by the Heat of Party, and the Animoſity of perſonal Quarrels, or ſo that by the Reſentment of ſome preſent Uneaſineſſes, Men are hinder'd from thinking on greater Evils at ſome Diſtance off, and not yet abſolutely felt, though juſt impending.

Now to charge every Party ſingly, according to what I have ſaid, and the Imputation of Inconſiſtency that I lay on them; I inſtance firſt in thoſe, as to the Generality, who carry on King *James*'s Intereſt *in their Endeavours*, and make *his* Party.

Firſt, then ſuppoſe that 'twere a Service to his Intereſt to have us weak at Sea, ſunk in our Trade, in Loſs of Seamen, Ships, Builders, and all Materials and Arts-men belonging; what would it avail to his Friends, (if *Engliſh-men*, and to no others do I ſpeak) to have him here fix'd in his Government, nay fix'd even with every one's Conſent here at home; if ſuddenly we found our ſelves thus low? How ſhould we e're regain this Loſs? how e're come up again with other Nations? Will they ſtand idle; ſee us take Breath, and let us riſe; or will they ſtay for us, and ſtop ſo long as till we grow again into our Place above them? If not; how ſhall we avoid the Conſequences above ſet down, and taken (I ſuppoſe) for granted; *viz.* that if we loſe the Practice of the Sea, we are then revolv'd again into our *old State*, meer Naked Britains; his that can take us; and (according to the natural and conſtant Practice of Mankind) by their Station about us, and their then readier Acceſs to us than any other Place, by lying ſo *fair*, and ſo on all ſides *open*; the aſſured common *Prize* that every Nation fights for, when aiming above others, or when but in the ſlighteſt Quarrel?

When once the Stroak is given that brings on this Condition; when once our *Naval Sinews* are cut; How is it that King *James* ſhall be *fix'd* here? How is it that either *His* or any Government ſhall be ſaid to be fix'd here with us; when we our ſelves, *as a People*, ſhould then *belong to others*, or lie *at Power to belong* to them: which, as Mankind and States are conſtituted, is not far different; ſince Power to take, and taking, are in thoſe Caſes never far aſunder: and ſince Parties are now eaſily made within a Nation conſiderable enough to ſerve a turn, and for any Invaders to ground upon: and that all Invaſions, though as perfectly ſo, as thoſe of *Goths* or *Vandales*, can be colour'd, now, with Reaſons of *Religion* and *Juſtice*, and as though even for the very Benefit of the invaded People? For no Countries hardly now are ever conquer'd but by a Force (as *Manifeſto*'s and *Declarations* ſet forth) intended for their *Relief and juſt Eſtabliſhment*: And the Name of *Conqueſt*, that comes to be eſtabliſhed after full Succeſs, is found to have been preceded by, and owe its Production to the very Names, however diſſonant, of *Aſſiſtance* or *Deliverance*.

In ſhort; if once we are exhauſted in a War, *ſo as that our Navigating Art and all the means of it be ſhared amongſt Foreigners, and the Current of our Trade drawn into other Channels*; which by no Art can be retrieved, nor any Change of Fortune; but by a turn that may give us the Advantage that we gave, and when all elſe are fighting, give us Peace; an Accident the hardlieſt

to

to be imagin'd; since, when once weak, we are above all others the sureſt to feel every Diſpute, and often like to be the chiefeſt Subject. If this come ever to be our Condition, as it is endeavour'd to be now made; let any Nation whatſoever give us, or return us a King; if this be the *Terms* of ſuch a Gift, (what-ever other *Terms* be made); if this be *that* that is to bring it about; any *Engliſh-Man* will have but a ſorry Bargain, and *ſuch* a King will be of little worth to *us*, or we to *him*. Grant that the Nation we receive him from be not, in the end, upon the account of the Lowneſs we ſhall be reduc'd to, left Maſters *at Sea* of all the World; and grant that they were not near ſo *by Land* either; Yet of what benefit will *this* be to us? If any Benefit, it will be this; That *that Way* 'twill not be determin'd whoſe we ſhall be; the *other Way* it will: the *one Way* we are a Province, and muſt ſerve immediately; the *other Way* we remain to be fought for, and the Diſpute muſt be in our own Land, *perhaps by more than two at once*.

If this be right, then not only they who ſerve *this Court* in the Preſent Way, ſerve *England* ill, but they too who ſerve *King James* in ſuch a way as is ſure to ſink us; ſet any other Neighbours over us in Navigation, and do our work as to that buſineſs: They, in effect, I ſay, do nothing for themſelves as *Engliſh Men*, nothing for King *James* as an *Engliſh* King.

But then that *theſe Sort* are doubly miſtaken, appears by this: For that it *is not* the likelieſt way to introduce King *James* (unleſs for *England* to be abſolutely conquer'd by another Nation, be the eaſieſt way; and ſuch a Throne, ſo gain'd to him, be thought moſt valuable, and moſt *a Throne*.) Becauſe that if, *by the Nation's Choice*, he would come in, it can *be only* when they find an Evil in this Government greater than they felt in that they chang'd from; or that they think they *would* feel by his return; and *then only*, *when* the dread of *that Power*, that now ſupports him, hangs leſs upon them, and that they can be freed from their Jealouſy of the King of *France*'s governing by King *James*. Now, whilſt we are loſing every day at Sea; whilſt the King of *France*'s Fleets, and Privateers grow, and the Terror of this ſpreads; there can be nothing left to give a more abſolute Horror of King *James* than this; and when an Invaſion comes, to drive the body of the People from an *Eaſineſs* and *Unconcernedneſs*, (which otherwiſe they would be in towards any ſuch Revolution carrying on) into a very *Deſperation*; which will produce the *uttermoſt Reſiſtance*, when it may be expected they ſhould be forc'd to yield.

The *Hint* that I have given may ſhew, I think, how much the Common *Jacobites* are beſides their Intereſt, and how well they know *to wiſh* as well for their King's particular Intereſt, as for the general Intereſt of their Country; and what *Mighty Service* they do King *James*, and *Diſ-ſervice* to King *William*, by their common way of Talking about the Force of *France* at *Sea*, and their Endeavours to give ſtill greater Grounds for ſuch Terror.

But

But to come now to the *Behaviour* of the other two Parties that are ſhut up within that of K. *William*'s.

Every Body knows there are *two Sorts* of Men; in *each* of which, there are ſuch as are *engag'd* to K. *William*'s Intereſt, as *abſolutely* and *without reſerve*, as he has required of them, or can require of them, in any proſtitute Senſe: and yet theſe Two are perpetually oppoſing one another, and make two Sides, which are commonly diſtinguiſh'd by the Names of *Whig* and *Tory*. According to the too good Succeſs that the Courtier has had; we ſee that, notwithſtanding any Intereſt that the Patriots (as many as there are) can make; and notwithſtanding *that Odium* which ſo many of the *Court-Followers* have incurr'd, yet there is ſtill this Fatality, that *Thoſe* continue the mainly prevalent in each; *thoſe* move the Herd of both theſe Parties; *thoſe* have, in effect, the ſway, that are with *all that Latitude* I have ſaid, engag'd in the Intereſt of this Court: For whoever calls this Court in queſtion; whoever doubts its good Intention to *Engliſh* Men, to *Engliſh* Liberties and Government; whoever quotes *paſt* Declarations, or inſtances a *preſent* Grievance; nay, or that in Diſcourſe is but *luke-warm* towards the State; a Way is found (and it ſeldom fails) to make that Man ill thought of by *the Herd*, ſuſpected by the Vulgar of his Party, and ſhunn'd as *a Deſerter*: For with one Party he is inſur'd *a Commonwealth's Man*, and with the other, *a Plain Jacobite*. *For what elſe ſhould he be, that acts againſt this Government?* Thus with one ſhort Queſtion, and that equivocal Term of *Government*, as it is put there, the Courtier does his buſineſs.

This ſhews what is underſtood *here* by *Whig* and *Tory*, meaningly as the Court is prevalent over both thoſe Parties. And *as thus*, let us conſider how they act: whether as likely to obtain their *common End* in the ſupport of this Government, in the manner 'tis ſuffer'd to be carried on by them; or whether, when that's done, as likely to obtain either of them their *ſeparate End*, (in proſpect of which they ſo aſſiſt, and court this Government) and as likely to carry their expected *Advantage over their oppoſite Party*.

The *Tories* have it for *their End* to ſee *the Church* eſtabliſh'd in as high Power as ever; to ſee it freed from the Eye-ſore of Diſſenters and Fanaticks: to remove *the ill Precedent* of *Scotland*: to ſet up Epiſcopacy in ſuch ſtrength as is requir'd by the Clergy-Men *themſelves*, to put them out of *fear of every thing*; and to have a King governing with as large a Prerogative as may be; but ſtill by the Means, and *under the Tuition* of ſuch a Church. The Whigs *dread* ſuch a Power in the Church, and are ſo diſatisfied with what it has of that kind already, fearing what may come, that they expect a greater Security than is given them at preſent, that thoſe who are Diſſenters from, or under the Mark of *the Church* for being ill Friends to it, may never ſee *It* in a condition to take its Revenge, or give them any Diſturbance. Theſe Men exclaim generally againſt all

Arbitrary

Arbitrary Power, but more especially *That* which the Church would introduce, and that their Enemies would most profit by.

Neither of these two Parties, towards the Satisfaction they desire, go now about the making of any new Laws, or attempt any Alteration in the Present Settlement: But their Labour is, the *gaining of the King*, and the getting those of their Fraternity (what-ever otherwise they be) into the Government. This is the only Means by which they, at this time, think to serve their Interest. This is the only Pledg they now ask for the Success of their respective Parties; *Each* promising to themselves that within a little, or when-ever his Majesty has made an end of his Enemies, He will declare for *them*, and for the future employ only the Men *of their Stamp*. Now, though all this while, according to the Methods kept up between these two Parties, the Government *were* like to stand, yet it is ridiculous and foolish what *either* of these Men expect.

We may, I think, be satisfied that (what-ever we may expect from any other) this *Court* is not likely to be at a stand, and rest contented with the allotted Revenue and Prerogative; much less to agree to a Diminution of either; though there be a considerable Party in *England* that think, and will still think, (which will cost the Court some Opposition) that the Prerogative is at a height in some Points very prejudicial to *England*, and likely to overturn the Ancient Government of it, one time or other; especially, since the Nobility is now so sunk from what it formerly ever was. It must therefore be suppos'd, that when this general Victory is obtain'd, and King *William* is establish'd, either he will be *immediately Absolute*, and have it in his Power to act as he fancies, or he will be as he now is, *under the Restraint of Laws*, and Parliaments to be struggled with. If it be *the First*; What is it that will move his Fancy towards the *Church-Men*, when under no Obligation, to reverse all the *Scotish*-Affairs; act contrary to the Principle of *Holland*, and all his Protestant *Calvinist* Acquaintance and Relations *abroad*, and exasperate so great a Body as the Dissenters and Whigs *here*? The Church-Men must be wonderfully conceited, and have a strange good Opinion of themselves, or a very wrong one of the King's Principle and Conscience, to think He would be thus serviceable to them out of *Affection meerly*. On the other side; If the Court be not (by being fully Absolute) freed from these Restraints, but be to work its way through, and that the Prerogative be in a craving State, and wants to gain upon the People, What can more satisfy *it* than the present Construction of *Whig* and *Tory* in Parliament? Is there any thing that the Court cannot carry? Whereas, if *one* Party were declar'd for, it would *not* be so. As to the *Whigs*, the thing is the same. This *Ballance* that the Court has got is too useful, and shall never be departed from, (so as that the Whigs shall be a jot more advanc'd) whilst the Court must use a Parliament: and if that time once come to be *over*, though it is not to be thought that the Court will *ever* act for the zealous Church-Men according to their Expectations, as above mention'd; yet

on the other ſide, to think that then any thing will be done more for the Whigs, for the Advancement of their *Perſons*, or in favour of their *Principles*, is what the leaſt of all can be imagin'd, and is the moſt abſurd.

Thus, *as a Party*, not either of them are likely to obtain their Ends: but their Contention to be ſtill improv'd againſt themſelves, and they made Acceſſaries in their own private Loſs; as ſubject to all the Inconveniences of ſuch a conſtant Feud, without prevailing any thing by it: And, *as Engliſh-Men*, inſtead of profiting themſelves, they are only like to be made Acceſſaries alſo in the general Publick Loſs, which we ſhall ſuffer *as a free People*, by loſing all our Privileges; and *as a People*, by falling, at length, under Foreign Subjection, and all the Miſeries that make *even that State* worſe to *us* than other Countries.

But to know this laſt; Why this Government cannot ſtand upon its preſent Baſis (which it is ſo unlikely to change) nor the Methods ſucceeds that *the Parties* take to ſupport us by this Court againſt our Enemies; why *even this* is truly impracticable; ſo as that *they* will prove *in the very utmoſt* diſappointed: We muſt conſider what it is that the Court *Does*, and *intends to do*; and what means the Parties approve, or admit of, in the Court, to carry on this War, in order to ſubdue the Enemy, obtain the Peace requir'd, and ſettle *Europe*, ſo as that we, with the other States of *Europe*, may not fear *one common Enemy*; nor we, *ſingly here*, an Enemy either ſecret or open, that may undermine or ruine *us alone*.

The purpoſe of this Government, the Conditions on which it roſe, and the Ends for which it was erected, are known to be; For the reſcuing us from a Power in the Crown, advanc'd by evil Miniſters and corrupt Judges, to be Superior to all our Laws; To ſecure us from ſuch an Inſatiableneſs of Prerogative as would ſwallow Liberty and Property, and take away the Privileges of the Subject; To free us even from ſuch a *Diſpoſition* of a Court as could not but tend to this Effect, and from *ſuch a Miniſtry* as nothing elſe could be expected under, *at any time*: And laſtly, To remove *that* under which all Laws and Conſtitutions can make but a ridiculous Safety for us; to remove, I ſay, *a ſtanding Army*. This being ſo; I ſay it is impoſſible to think how this Government can ſtand, if theſe Ends are not anſwer'd; except it fix it ſelf here by abſolute Conqueſt; which cannot be but with a Foreign Help: and *that* reduces the thing to this; That *we muſt be a Province to that Prince or State that is in the greateſt Power abroad*; however we may pleaſe our ſelves with calling this *our own* Government, or *our* King that then ſhall govern us.

I ſay, though this Government could free it ſelf from the Enemy it is now engag'd with; yet, not anſwering its Ends, as above-mention'd; but directly on the contrary, purſuing thoſe others it was ſet up in oppoſition to, and ſo (as I may call it) ſubverting its own Foundation, it cannot ſtand: For if the Foreign Force and Power of *a dreaded Neighbour* be no longer on foot, ſo as to fright Men (as at preſent) into the ſupport of this Government *at any rate*

or

or prosper; nor that a Foreign Force, in the hands of these Governours, overpower and conquer us; 'Tis not to be thought, that *the Spirit and Principle* that brought in this Government, though all the Impediments of a then so heightned Prerogative, and of Passive-Obedience Principles, that are so much level'd since that time; 'Tis scarce to be imagin'd, I say, that *that Spirit* of Impatience against a Government, setting up the enslaving Attempts and Ministers, should be *so sunk*, against that comes, (when it has had, all this while, such Means *of growing*) as that it could not make its way towards a *new Change*, and act *another Revolution*; when the *same Need*, with an *additional Resentment and Shame* for having been abus'd, together with a *readier Means*, and the Way so much facilitated by the foregoing Precedent, *invites them to it*. Or, if by themselves the *Party for Liberty* and the *Discontented* would not be able; yet whilst there was any of the *excluded Branch* remaining, they would by *that means* make an Effort which would perpetually shake, if not quickly overturn, this Government.

But that we may prove, *how* that but to get through their present Enemies, and reduce the Power of *France*, is a Work but vainly expected from this Government in the Posture that Affairs are in; let us consider how this War is manag'd; How our Administration stands in respect of it; and whether, at our rate, we can so much as continue a defensive War.

Let us compute what are the Expences of the Nation in this War: *What* are the *Losses and Charges* we suffer by it; and *what* are the *Reparations* we make our selves, by the Prejudice drawn from thence to the Enemy.

Our Losses are, the exhausting of the Wealth, the *Stock* of the Nation, in the vast Sums drawn out from thence, for the Use of Foreign Countries, and the numerous Troops paid in those Countries: And at the same time that our Sustinence *goes out*, it is hindred from *coming in* to us; We losing every-day in *Trade*; the Profit of *that* still cut from us; and that of it which remains amongst us, turning, in a manner, against us; it being the *Importation* of Foreign Commodities that *now* chiefly drives it; and our own Part begun to be manag'd by Foreigners: by which means, we abandon to *others* what *we* are every day losing in the *Navigating Practice*, and the *breed* of Sailors and other Arts-Men belonging, that should be raising amongst *us* here. And this must needs be so, since the *French*, to all Effects, *in prejudice of us*, remain, in reality, the *Masters of the Sea*, notwithstanding that Advantage which *another* Providence than that of *Men*, gave us over them: A Providence which turn'd *that* into a *Victory* on our side; which (according to the surest Consequences of Humane Affairs, by the whole Disposition of Matters, and the Grounds, and Form of that Enterprize on foot) should have prov'd the *Interception* and *Ruine* of a great part of our Fleet, and the Execution of a Descent which then surely would have made it self been felt. Now, if with

ſuch an Aſſiſtance of Fortune, ſo far from being ever to be hop'd again, we are not able to maintain the Sea for *Engliſh* Ships to ſtir without being taken; that *French* Squadrons ſtill, Mounſieur *Du-Bart*, and all the other numerous Privateers, with Veſſels ſome of 50 Guns and upwards, lie in our Channel, from off *Ireland*, and round our Coaſt, do what they pleaſe, take us whole Fleets of Merchant-Men together, ſupply their King largely with what they take of ours, make Fortunes for themſelves conſiderable, and enrich the Sea-Port Towns of their Country, that flouriſh now, and grow prodigiouſly with our Spoils; If this, by our Management, be *now* ſo, and not prevented; If it be thus *now*, this very Seaſon, after what has happen'd for us, How will it be *henceforward?* How are we like to put a ſtop to this? And if we do not put a ſtop to what *already* is of this kind, (though it ſhould grow *no more* upon us) where muſt we be within a little?

Here then we ſee our *Loſſes*, and where our *Waſting* is. And as to what *Reparations* it may be expected we ſhould make our ſelves; we are ſo far from aiming at the Ruine of our Enemy, or the offending of him in *this* way, that we are not ſo much as in any proſpect of being in a Condition of preventing that Ruine which comes in upon our ſelves *this Way*; though it be properly *our chief* and *only* Ruine that comes *thus*.

If *this Way*, then, we do no good; How, in what manner is it, that, in bearing all this, and by what we pay ſo deeply for, we are to *make even* with our Enemy, and *more* than ſo? How is *he* to be made come off at length the greateſt Sufferer, in order to oblige him to yield? *Where*, if not *here*, are we to make the Impreſſion upon him that muſt give him *the worſt* in the War?

There are none except thoſe who dream of *a Deſcent*; (which though but for the ſame Reaſons that made it laſt Year unſucceſsful, cannot be expected but to prove ſo this next, and is likely to prove more fatal to us, if ſo;) there are none, I ſay, except thoſe that under ſuch *Councils*, ſuch *Miniſters* intruſted, and ſuch an *Adminiſtration* as ours, do flatter themſelves that *a Deſcent* ſhall be able to be made and be ſupported, ſo as to turn to the *Enemy's* Ruine and *not our own*; there are none beſides this ſort of Men, that go about confidently to give any Hopes of Matters to be done by making an Impreſſion any where on *France* with our *Land-Armies*. Which notwithſtanding, let us examine, ſince it is what we rely on. For being not in a way ſo much as to preſerve our ſelves at Sea; much leſs are we in the Deſign of ruining our Enemy that way, deſtroying his Trade, and cutting off his Supply of Riches by which he bears up in the War: although indeed, thoſe very Riches come *only* into him by his Shipping, and the Exportations *that way* of his Country's Products: the Money that he gets for them in a *Land-Trade*, with any Country joining to him, being in compariſon very inconſiderable, and much over-ballanc'd by the Charge he is at, in thoſe Countries, for many Neceſſities of his

his own, (especially in War;) and by the vast Sums of Money continually distributed there in Pensions; as by considering only *Switzerland*, will plainly appear. But we, I say, do not apply our selves this way towards the Reduction of *France*. *To ruine him in his* West-India *Trade, and cut him off his Sea-Men; To shut up his Commerce Northwards, through our own Seas; To spoil him* (as might be) *some of his chief Harbours and Sea-Port Towns; destroy the rest of his Ships of Force, and ruine his Trading even in the* Mediterranean: This is what we either think not of at all, or think is insignificant, or not so noble (nor so saving, or of dispatch, it may be) as the Campaining Method at Land: Or as being less suitable to the Genius of *our Prince*, so also less suitable to that of *our Nation:* Which, besides, will be rais'd to high Esteem and Power, and have its Liberties best guarded by the Establishment of a Noble Army of its own, thus trained up; by that time they, join'd with the Foreigners, *Dependents on our King*, have made us victorious over the Enemy, and brought on for us our so wish'd-for *Peace*, which *then their Interest will endure.*

The Sea therefore we leave as it is; and our Work being not to be done, or not convenient to our Present Court it should be done, *that way*; our Dependance is upon *another.* Now to know how *this Other* is like to succeed with us; let us consider in what Places of *France* it is that we may expect to make the Impression *at Land.*

The Hopes of *Savoy* are over. The ill Success which that Attempt had at a time so advantageous, leaves indeed little to hope for any future time, after that this Baffle has given the *French* so great Security, cut off our Expectation from an Assistance of Protestants there, and given the occasion to the *French* to put themselves in another posture on that side, strengthen their Frontier, and secure those Passages: and to do, at least, *so much* for themselves there; altho it were not likely, that they should be found to carry in a War this Summer into *Piedmont*, that shall oblige that Prince to make his Terms.

It is not on the *Rhine* surely, that we expect our *Enemy* should be *Sufferer*; when, instead of being put to use the Strength he has provided for his Defence there, he can every Year raise Contributions on that side sufficient to maintain the Armies he imploys there; and take, with Countries, whole Regiments at a time; so as the Duke of *Wirtemberg* and his Troops, were taken, lately, without so much as fighting, and about 3000 of the best *German* Horse taken.

We do not expect, I suppose, that an Army from *Spain* will enter *France*, or that that Nation is in a Condition to make an *offensive* War against *France.* So that the *stress* of all lies now in *Flanders.* And do we expect to see ever any better Armies there, more numerous, more united, or more animated than they have been these last Campaigns? The Confederacy may soon be *lesser*; But what can make it *greater?*

Are we to find any other *Generals* of that Confederacy than what we have? Or will *these* come to be abler, and out-grow the *French* ones at length by Experience? If it be an Abſurdity to think thus; is it not a great one to think we ſhall have other *Succeſs* than what we have had? And what has *that* been? At *Fleurus* we receive a Rout, where we loſe a good Part of an Army. Another Year, if we are not beat in the Campaign time, we are charg'd in the Rear, and a Mark given us at going off. *Mons* is taken one Year, and *Namur* the next; (with what Attendance is notorious.) So that if our ſtrongeſt Towns, we ſee, go off before our ſtrongeſt Armies; what are we to expect will be the Fate of the other Towns that are as yet remaining with us, and are the laſt that keep the *Barrier*? They too, if not immediately, muſt in a Campaign or two more, go the ſame way of courſe: though at the cloſing of our Campaigns (which cannot keep us up *but a defenſive* War) we endeavour to take a kind of Revenge by attacquing the *French* with as much Advantage and Succeſs as we did now lately at *Steinkirk*. But can we think, notwithſtanding this, that by recruiting our waſted Troops, and by raiſing other new ones, proportionable to what *France* raiſes, we ſhall *prevent* all this; and not only ſo, but after having retaken *Namur* and *Mons*, with what elſe we have loſt, be able to pierce into *France* through treble Ranks of Garriſons, by taking of them one by one, or all at once, or leaving 'em behind, and marching through 'em? Surely Men of thought will ſtick at this.

But notwithſtanding all this; The Engagers with the Court, carrying a Majority in this Parliament with 'em, are giving the Government this ineffectual Aſſiſtance, and are drawing from us vaſt Sums to ſupply Confederate Armies, and Armies of our own abroad: As if this were really to do us good, would avail any thing, and were our proper Method of ſecuring our ſelves; Whilſt our Sea-Practice (*whence* ſhould be drawn the *French's* Ruine, but *whence* our own is now) lies in the ſhamefulleſt Condition that can be. What ſignifies it, that we have a number of huge Ships to ſail about together a Month or two in the Summer; if ſtill the *French* keep all they have in the *Weſt-Indies*, and the Means that they have there (if not taken from 'em) of breeding Sea-Men, above all the World beſides; if here, in *our* Seas, they breed vaſt Numbers, and ſet out numerous and mighty Ships out of the ſpoil of us and our Ships? If Trading be not ſafe for *us*; our Seas being *to us* ſhut up, and *Sweeds*, *Danes*, *Portugues*, and other Nations to whom the Sea is free, growing into Trade, and carrying all Supplies (which *thus* we cannot hinder) into *France*.

'Tis plain, that if we cannot alter this, we certainly muſt ſink. 'Tis againſt *this*, that we ſhould turn all our Power, our Riches; which would not then be doubly loſt in being *given amongſt Foreigners*, from *England*, never to return thither;

thither; and being *given* beſides, *in vain*. 'Tis towards *this* we ſhould turn all our Care and Counſels; and therefore, if the *good Genius* of *England* has not Power enough, by Patriots within it, to alter this Adminiſtration, all is in vain, and *we* muſt fall.

That, *in this reſpect*, we do *now* every thing ſo improperly, every thing ſo waſtfully that we pretend to do; and that there is ſo little a Part aimed at or intended, of what might farther be done by us than is attempted under the preſent Management; there is indeed no wonder. When of all Parts of our Government, there is not any more looſe, more inconſiſtent, more corrupt, than that Part which regards our Sea-Affair. We have no Council, no Committee for Trade eſtabliſh'd, nothing of any Office inſtituted, or Officers properly qualified and empower'd to inſpect our Trade, to report the Condition of it, and propoſe the Regulations neceſſary, to our Parliament; inſomuch, that *that Aſſembly* is forc'd, upon Occaſions, to have recourſe to the Merchants themſelves, to be inſtructed, and are often at a loſs, and (as in the *Eaſt-India* Buſineſs) in a likelihood of ruining Trade, by having their only Information in thoſe *nice* Matters from ſuch as are ſurely intereſted one way or ther. Our Offices of Admiralty and the like, are diſpos'd of in Gifts to Men of Intrigue: and (as the World has now ſufficiently remark'd) he that by his Skill can work a Party, delay or bring on a Buſineſs in the Parliament, and has the *Houſe-Craft*, is recommended to the ſteering of a Fleet, and the ordering of our Naval Force. All is of a peice; and throughout all the Places, any ways relating to this *great Truſt*, down to the very inferiour Officers, in ſingle Ships, *Bribery* and *Cabal* does every thing.

If this go on, as has been ſhewn, *England ſinks*, whoever *riſes*; We are expos'd to the laſt Miſery, and a Foundation, at this rate, is laying for ſuch *a State* as was before repreſented. And *now*, at this preſent time, if the Houſe of Commons carry not what they have begun upon the Admiralty, to a real thorough Reformation in all *thoſe* Affairs, however *the others* are ſuffer'd to lie; if our Force at Sea, and the natural Strength that way, which we have yet left amongſt us, be not by their ordering otherwiſe exerted; other-gueſs Encouragements ſet up for Sea-Men; the *Sea Souldiering*, the very *Vocation* it ſelf, by a better Uſage of thoſe that follow *it*, made more advantageous than as *it* now ſtands, that *it* may draw in more than *any other*, and not be, as *it* is, the moſt juſtly declinable, and ready to be abandon'd by thoſe that are already in; if there be not an other-gueſs rewarding of thoſe that ſerve well; the proper Methods ſet up to clear us of the *French Cruiſers, and their Privateers*; fit Ships, with right Regulation, apply'd to that Work; The Dealing with *them* not left (ſo as it now is) as an ungrateful Work only, but the Reducing of them made (by Rewards fitted to ſuch Service, as well for Privateers and Adventurers of our own, as for the Ships of the Publick) an Em-

ployment

ployment moſt advantageous, and which may be heartily undertaken by thoſe that ſo expoſe themſelves; *In ſhort*, what-ever ill Performance, Unskilfulneſs and Corruption be ſuffered in any other Part of our Government; However Matters may go in *Weſtminſter-Hall*; however the Chancery be filled, or any Offices in the *Nation* that are to do Right amongſt Particulars of *that Body*; however any other Part of the Miniſtry ſtand, according to whatſoever Party; *If* our Parliament do not now *right* our Country in this Concern, do not *redreſs* and *aſſure this part* of our Adminiſtration, in Hands they can intruſt, and ſhall have Power over to make Faithful; and by *their own Management* (for it will be by no other) ſave thus what we are loſing not only to the French, but to all other Foreigners that uſe the Sea; If they do not *thus much*, and ſuddenly ſet us in another Courſe to regain what's paſt, and do our utmoſt *here*; However great theſe *Armies* and *Confederacies* ſound, that fill ſo many Heads at preſent; whatever *Pomp* and *Grandeur* in this Government hinders them from dreaming any Inſecurity in it; I fear they will not long be Poſſeſſors of the Power that accompanies them now in their Seats at *Weſtminſter*, nor be the Maſters long of thoſe Eſtates that give them now the Places they have there. Their giving Millions ſo liberally, will but haſten the Buſineſs: though many give their Concurrence to this moſt unprovident way of giving, and to the Methods proportionable, of raiſing what is thus given: not as unſenſible of Miſmanagement; but out of meer Fear of being over-run. But it is ordinary to ſee Men in their Fears run more directly upon their Ruine; when terrified they ſtrive moſt earneſtly to avoid it. Yet if they would act rationally, according to what they fear, why is not *the Fleet* firſt ſecured? why is not *that Money* firſt found out, ſecured on the beſt Funds, and well appropriated, that the Money *really* given to *that* may not leaſt ſerve *that purpoſe*; that it may not run a common riſk with the other Money expected to be raiſed; nor the *neceſſary* Charge of our Navy run the ſame Danger of being unſupplied, as any of thoſe *exorbitant* and *unneceſſary* Charges we are to be at beſides? What if there be found Stops and Difficulties; if the Money fails for *thoſe latter* Expences, muſt it fail too for our *Great* and perhaps *only neceſſary* Expence, that of our Ships and Seamen?

What-ever be, this muſt be look'd to. And (to join all to what I have ſhown before) he that is *an Engliſh-man* in any Party, and forgets *this*, knows not that he is drawing on his own and Countries Ruine, in the Proſpect of eſtabliſhing his Country by means of that Party, or together with that Party's Intereſt which he follows: for though a Peace ſhould be concluded at laſt, according to the Scope of K. *James*'s Party, by which *that* King ſhould be made to be acknowledged; or though the Adherents to K. *William* that are ſupporting him *his Way*, ſhould ſee him prevailing with his *Land-Forces*, and

France

France reduc'd to such a Peace as should cause the Acknowledgment of King *William* here; yet at the end of all this, if by *that time*, the Work that is now doing apace be brought to its effect, and we left *Inferiours* at Sea, cheated and beaten out of our Trade, and perish'd in our *Naval Power*, with nothing but a Power *at Land* to defend us: All the Advantage that the Party of *English Men* then prevailing will obtain, besides their Triumph, or their Revenge over their Adversaries, will be to hold a *Government* under the Force of a Foreigner, and *which* can be held no otherwise; and to give us ever after for a Government, that which shall be enforc'd by the Nation, or Prince left with the strongest Force abroad, together with the Honour of being thenceforward constantly the *Test* of Power and Precedency to the contending States of *Europe*, by falling always to *their* Lot who can force others hence, and place themselves.

Now if there be any *English-Man* in these Parties, that will *thoroughly* think; I appeal to him, if what we do *all-together* in Parliament, or what *each Party* drives at *singly*, is like to bring any Happiness to one, whose Country is *England*. If the removing one Ministry for another; the getting Men, or keeping Men in place for only Party-Merits: The *driving* in the common Manner, for the Interest of *this* Court or *that*; for *the Court now undermost*, by endeavouring to embroil our Sea-Affairs, bring us Loss of Trade and Ruine of Shipping; that by such Misery the People may (as those think) be induc'd to abandon this Government: And *for the Interest of the Present Court*; by complying with any sort of Methods it takes, however censur'd at other times; by advancing Prerogative at a time which is the only Ever to be hop'd for to bring it down from its Encroachments, and to confirm the Rights of the People, which are hardly supportable under the Weight yet left in some Fundamental Points: By gaining Acts for multiplying of Treasons, instead of securing us from the Power that the Crown now has of making Treason too easily out of anything: By the justifying any Commitments as well as Trials; the setting on foot (to a vexatious End, and no other) *needless* severe Oaths, so extensive and generally to be enforc'd, for the Punishment only of Mens Consciences, or the taking away of all Conscience, so as to lose the Benefit of all Oaths in any Case; *a Thing* so destructive to all Government, and (to our great Misery) begun already to be felt amongst us, and encreasing daily by the Commonness that Oaths are expos'd to, in serving every Turn. In fine, By the giving away all our Wealth to the Managers of the Court in *prodigious Sums*; such as, if possible, would suffice their Greediness, and surmount their Lavishment; whilst still the Matters of *our* Ocean (that Ocean that should be ours) stard

as

as they do: I appeal (as I have said) to any rational Man of any Country, that can lay aside Passion whilst he thinks, whether this tends to any thing but Ruine.

What, after this, may be expected should be said on what now *should* be done, I leave to *Inference*: for I have said enough already, and need not repeat.

I have said what it is that should be pervious to every *Regard* an *English* Man can have; what it is that only can make the Success of any *English* Party, a Success of *their own*, or advantageous to them, their Friends or their Posterity. And when such a *Regard* [illegible] in a contrary-wise changed, or but neglected; what sort of Service [illegible] Interest is tied to *England*, are like to do themselves with their [illegible] *Blue* and *Red* in other Matters that they are pursuing. And in all this, if I shall not have been able to turn Men towards any *publick* Action, or [illegible] of Managing, that may tend to our Recovery; yet, at least, I may have given them so far to think on *certain Things*, as may turn perhaps [illegible] that Heat and Fury they act with (of themselves, or led by other [illegible]) in the Service of some Interests, which when they understand, they will not think of serving *as they do*.

FINIS.

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